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Financial Transactions Tax: Panacea, Threat, or Damp Squib? 
 
1.  Introduction 
Against the background of growing political demands for regulation to curb financial 
sector excesses, or (to use an out-of-fashion phrase) overtrading, this paper takes a new 
look at some old and recurrent proposals to tax finance on a much larger scale, especially 
by taxing transaction flows. 
 
A confluence of events over the past year or so promise to bring the taxation of financial 
intermediation center stage.    
 
−  First, the severe failures of finance that became evident since 2007, and the 
perception that uncontrolled and lightly-taxed expansion of financial transactions 
an financial intermediation are to blame has led to a view that regulation and 
taxation that have the effect of constraining excesses in finance would be socially 
desirable.   
 
−  Second, growing fiscal deficits in many advanced economies is heightening the 
search for revenue-raising mechanisms with limited adverse effects on the 
economy.  Because financial taxes are paid in the first instance by large 
institutions they can seem relatively painless, at least from a political point of 
view.  Besides, especially when one considers the dollar size of potential tax 
bases—such as total banking assets, or the flow of financial transactions—and 
hence the apparent possibility of generating a large volume of revenue from a low 
rate of tax.  
 
−  Third, growing concerns about tax havens has increased the international political 
will to work effectively to control and limit flows between advanced economies 
and tax havens designed for tax evasion, money laundering and other illegal 
purposes.  This could, if made effective, have the side-benefit of making it easier 
to limit the international leakage of the base of any taxes applied to financial 
intermediaries.   3 
 
Attracting adherents both on the political right and the left, the idea of placing significant 
reliance on the taxation of finance, in particular through the taxation of financial 




   
Anticipating this growing interest, the present paper reviews the main issues that arise in 
considering new proposals for a broad increase in financial sector taxation, especially 
those centering around the taxation of financial transactions. Transactions taxes have 
always attracted reformers especially because of their apparently large base (seeming to 
offer sizable revenue with low deadweight costs) and an apparent simplicity and 
transparency in their design.   
 
Proposals of this type vary considerably as to the range of transactions that would be 
made subject to the tax.  A relatively sharp distinction is customarily made between a 
securities transactions tax (STT), a currency transactions tax (CTT), and a bank debit tax.   
 
In his General Theory Keynes proposed an STT to reduce destabilizing speculation in 
equities; Tobin’s similar CTT dates from 1972 and had the goal of reducing destabilizing 
currency speculation.  Bank debit taxes have been employed in several countries, 
especially in Latin America.   
 
The explosive growth in financial derivative transactions over the past quarter century 
introduces a range of further possibilities.  One proposal, which we will look at in greater 
depth, is for a comprehensive tax on all financial transactions to replace all taxes. 
 
                                                 
1 That interest is already growing in this area is exemplified by policy advocacy work such as Baker (2008) 
and the commentary on this in the New York Times, the Guardian and in blogs; Pisek’s (2008) 
presentation to the European Parliament., as well as websites such as http://www.apttax.com/ (Edgar 
Feige’s scheme) and http://www.nationaldebittax.com/ (Leonard Crisp’s scheme).  Financial transactions 
taxes are also on the agends of the UN’s Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development, as 
discussed below. 
 
   4 
We will argue that attempts to raise a significant percentage of GDP in revenue from a 
broad-based financial transactions tax are likely to fail both by raising much less revenue 
than expected and by generating far-reaching changes in economic behavior.  Although 
the side-effects would include a sizable restructuring of financial sector activity, this 
would not occur in ways corrective of the particular forms of financial overtrading that 
were most conspicuous in contributing to the crisis. 
 
We begin by looking at the three distinct goals currently driving interest in this type of 
tax reform: anti-avoidance, efficiency and revenue, before proceeding to consideration of 
the ideal tax—one which both improves economic efficiency by correcting market 
failures and negative externalities and also generates a sizable flow of revenue. 
 
2.  Anti-avoidance, efficiency and revenue goals 
2.1   Curbs on tax havens will increase the scope for taxation of finance  
When funds can easily flow across frontiers, financial assets and their yields cannot 
easily be taxed.  This can usefully restrain onerous and poorly-designed taxation of 
finance.  But it can also result in distortions as, for example, when unremunerated reserve 
requirements are retained for local currency deposits, but not for foreign currency 
deposits – a differential which can have the unintended adverse side-effect of promoting 
deposit dollarization, likely engendering problems of stability.  Time and again, one 
hears that taxes on the financial sector cannot be applied because funds will migrate (cf. 
Reisen, 2002). 
 
But now, coordinated worldwide action to restrict the movement of financial flows to tax 
havens has emerged on the policy agenda. Heightened international official concern 
about the role of tax havens in eroding the tax base of both advanced and developing 
economies is evident not least from the communiqués of recent G-20 summits.
2
                                                 
2 “We stand ready to take agreed action against those jurisdictions which do not meet international 
standards in relation to tax transparency.” – G20 Communique April 2, 2009.  cf. Owens and Saint Amans 
(2009). 
  This is 
not a new concern (Christian Aid, 2008), and there is little indication that tax havens 
have had a significant effect in contributing to the financial crisis (Loomer and Maffini,   5 
2009). But the increased awareness of it is indisputable. Here we take this heightened 
agenda as a given and consider only its broad implications for the financial sector.  
Regardless of the motivation of such restrictions, if effective, they open to policymakers 
the possibility of using a wide range of taxes hitherto seen as ineffective and of 
increasing taxes on others.  Good or bad, this would change the landscape of financial 
taxation. 
 
For, if there is an effective crackdown on tax havens, this could have the effect of closing 
the bolt-holes that allow tax bases to migrate away from high tax jurisdictions.  It is 
important to recognize that low tax rates are not in themselves a sufficient criterion for 
designation as a tax haven; exchange of information and transparency issues are also 
relevant.  Nevertheless, the removal of these bolt-holes would have the effect of reducing 
the elasticity of any tax base that was liable to migrate to a tax haven if subjected to a 
high rate of tax.  This applies to many forms of tax base, but especially to the highly 
mobile tax bases of the financial sector. With the lower elasticity, the potential revenue 
would increase, and the distortions on product supply and employment from taxing these 
bases would decline. 
 
In short, an effective crackdown on tax avoidance would make it easier to introduce new 
or higher taxes without fear that the tax base will migrate away.  Taxes which, because of 
that fear, have been infeasible to date would become potentially viable. 
 
In addition, offshore financial sectors that are currently dependent on offering a low tax 
environment would shrink, with specific consequences for the host economies.  This is 
potentially serious for a small number of very small countries (and territories – many of 
the tax havens of the developing world, including the largest, the Cayman Islands, are in 




   6 
2.2 Efficiency  
(i)  Avoiding tax-induced distortions and correcting market failure  
Almost all taxes alter some relative price and hence change equilibrium behavior.  Where 
markets are already efficient, efficient tax design seeks to minimize distorting effects of 
this type; where there is market failure, the impact of an efficient tax will be to move 
relative prices in the direction of a socially efficient outcome. 
 
It is well-understood that the financial sector is highly responsive to the design of tax 
rules.  Product design and innovation and location decisions can be heavily dependent on 
their tax treatment.  The effects can be large and rapid.  Taking account of efficiency 
effects is therefore even more important for financial sector taxation than for taxation of 
other sectors: greater danger of imposing costs, greater opportunity for correcting market 
failure. 
 
Another feature of the financial system is its great ability to adapt and even make profits 
from distortions including tax distortions.  Sometimes the imposition of a new tax rule 
generates a business opportunity for financial firms who may then become lobbyists for 
its retention even if the tax is having a damaging and distorting effect on the rest of the 
economy.  This means that financial sector lobbyists are not a reliable source of 
information about where financial taxes are creating problems for society.  More 
generally, the interests of the financial sector cannot be considered as paramount in 
determining optimal financial sector tax design. 
 
Recognizing this, but perhaps underestimating the role of a healthy financial system in 
underpinning sustained economic growth, there was a tendency until fairly recently for 
the financial sector in different countries to be subjected to distorting taxes and quasi-
taxes such as unremunerated reserve requirements, transactions taxes, taxes on gross 
interest receipts or payments, prohibition on the deduction of incurred but not realized 
loan losses
3
                                                 
3 Until recently, the dominant interpretation of IFRS has been that such losses could not even be reported 
in a bank’s accounts, let alone deducted from revenue before the calculation of taxable income. 
 and the like.  At that stage, economists concentrated most of their financial   7 
sector taxation to advice to developing country policymakers on the need to remover the 
most distorting taxes.   
 
Subsequently, two factors made national authorities more alert to the distortions that 
financial sector taxes could introduce into the economy.  The first of these factors was 
growing awareness of the systemic importance of the financial sector in underpinning 
and accelerating economic growth: that implied that distortions to this sector could be 
especially damaging to economic welfare on a broad front.  The second factor was the 
rapid increase in financial globalization which had the effect of increasing the elasticity 
of financial sector responses to any given tax, as financial tax bases simply migrated 
abroad.   
 
Now the pendulum has swung beyond its midpoint.  No longer satisfied with merely 
achieving tax neutrality, policymakers are again paying attention to the corrective 
potential of taxation.  Like the perceived need for ramped-up regulation, this responds to 
the conspicuous failures and excesses exposed by the financial crisis.  
 
Can the design of tax policy be used actively to realign financial sector activity in line 
with social welfare of the economy as a whole, for example, reducing systemic 
prudential risks?  After all, if finance responds powerfully to price and rate of return 
incentives, the job of the regulator is eased if tax-inclusive prices and returns faced by 




   
 
 
                                                 
4 In parallel to new thinking on tax policy, there has been much current discussion of the incentive effects 
of other aspects of government financial policy.  For instance, under asymmetric information (moral hazard 
and adverse selection), the incentive effects of alternative intervention and bail-out strategies by the 
authorities can matter a lot.  Good design of such strategies exploits these incentive effects to achieve an 
improved overall outcome as financial firms adjust their behaviour to take account of the altered 
probability of being bailed-out. Tax policy can be seen as aligning financial firm behaviour in dimensions 
that are less sensitive to strategic failure behaviour, but instead relate to the more predictable aspects of 
financial firms’ activities.   8 
(ii) Transactions taxes, market volatility and mispricing 
In years gone by, the main focus for use of corrective taxation in the financial sector had 
been excessive asset price and exchange rate volatility, and possible sustained 
“mispricing” of financial assets (or deviations from fundamental equilibrium prices) 
resulting from short-term speculative flows.
5
 
   
Keynes, focusing on mispricing in securities markets, argued for an STT on these 
grounds.  This idea has been subjected to a variety of empirical tests which do indeed 
suggest, not surprisingly, that an STT has consequences, not least through lowering the 
price of assets which by their nature are likely to be traded frequently (Bond et al. 2006).  
But it remains quite unclear from this literature whether an STT would increase or 
decrease volatility.  After all, speculation in a liquid market can be stabilizing, and this 
turns out to be possible in practice as well as in theory.   
 
The original Tobin tax (CTT) proposal was to put “sand in the wheels of finance” to 
inhibit speculative cross border flows in foreign exchange markets, again with the aim of 
reducing volatility and mispricing.  Here again it is unclear whether such a tax would 
indeed be stabilizing.   
 
Close analysis of the minute-by-minute microstructure of the foreign exchange market 
reveals that most foreign exchange transactions (spot and forward) have nothing to do 
with speculation, but are instead undertaken to hedge risk and ensure liquidity.
6
 
  (The 
same would be true of interest rate swaps.)  
This observation, which can probably be extrapolated to markets whose microstructure is 
less well understood, provides a very strong additional reason why transactions taxes 
might not stabilize markets.  As will be mentioned later, this alternative perspective on 
                                                 
5 Formal theoretical models such as that of Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) confirm that there are theoretical 
reasons to believe that such a tax could be stabilizing if introduced in all relevant markets (no tax havens). 
6 Evidence on this point from the literature on market microstructure is provided by Mende and Menkhoff 
(2003).  That this consideration undermines the “corrective tax” case for a financial transactions tax has 
been acknowledged by radical economists such as Grahl and Lysandrou (2003).  On the other hand, Galati 
and Melvin (2004) is representative of observers who continue to assign medium-term speculative and 
hedging motives to the bulk of foreign exchange market transactions.   9 
the motivation for the bulk of transactions in securities markets has implications for 
revenue also. 
 
(iii)  Transactions taxes and complex derivatives  
Following the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market and its knock-on effects 
on the rest of World’s financial and economic systems, asset price volatility has been 
somewhat overshadowed as a target for policy by comparison with imprudent or reckless 
lending and especially the use of over-complex financial derivatives as a means of 
apparently reducing risk while actually increasing it.  Regulation of contract types and 
agent reward structures has been the focus of much policy attention here, but a tax 
solution – even if partial – could also be considered.  The question is, what workable tax 
rule could be brought into play as a useful complement to regulation, by adapting 
incentive structures so as to ensure that they better aligned to social welfare in this area, 
and hence act as corrective taxes, reducing the adverse impact of market failures? 
 
2.3  Revenue 
The financial sector has long been a reliable revenue source for governments – even 
though from time-to-time (as at present) bank failure events have triggered large fiscal 
outlays to limit depositor losses and protect the smooth functioning of the payments 
system.  Revenue raising has been the objective of most of the financial transactions 
taxes that have been brought into effect, especially the bank debit taxes of Latin America.   
 
(i) Revenue from CTT 
As mentioned above, the Tobin CTT tax was originally conceived of as a corrective tax, 
but it has increasingly been seen as a suitable revenue source for development 
assistance.
7
                                                 
7 The influential Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development (
 Because of the concentration of foreign exchange trading in just a few 
international financial centers (according to the latest BIS survey, fully three-quarters of 
http://www.leadinggroup.org), 
which was founded “after the Paris Ministerial Conference on Innovative Development Financing 
Mechanisms in 2006” and comprises 55 countries, together with IFIs (including the World Bank) and 
NGOs, has been looking at the CTT, and notes that it would generate “stable and predictable flows.”  
France and Belgium have already committed to the adoption of a CTT provided all of the other member 
states of the EU also adopt one.   10 
traditional foreign exchange market transactions are conducted in just 6 centers: UK, US, 
Switzerland, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong), proponents of the Tobin tax as a revenue 
source have seen it chiefly as being international in its revenue goals, and not suitable as 
a source of national revenue (Spahn, 2002).  Of course, another problem with getting 
national revenue from the tax is the fact that unilateral tax increases on foreign exchange 
dealings are likely to result in considerable base migration. 
 
Despite earlier proposals for a CTT tax of as high as 1 percent, a consensus had emerged 
in the literature by the mid-1990s that 0.1 percent should be regarded as a ceiling on CTT 
rates beyond which they would reduce liquidity too much, thereby deterring international 
trade (Nissanke, 2004).
8  Nissanke examines the revenue potential of rates in the region 
0.01% to 0.02%, which she believes would reduce transaction volumes only modestly 




  Interestingly, Mende and Menkhoff (2003) claim that sorting the 
Tobin tax proposals by their date of issue reveals that the suggested rates have become 
lower and lower over time.  Spratt’s (2006) version of this tax has a rather 
comprehensive base said to be over €100 trillion covering all spot and derivative foreign 
exchange transactions, but he proposes a very low tax rate of just 0.005% designed to 
raise about €5 billion for development assistance.  At this rate the tax should evidently 
have no very little effect on speculative flows; it does not have a corrective objective.  
(ii) Revenue from STT 
Securities transactions taxes (STT) are now as likely to be advocated for their revenue 
potential as for any dampening effect on speculation.  That of Schulmeister et al. (2008) 
is quite comprehensive for wholesale transactions, applying to spot transactions for 
stocks and bonds, and derivative transactions (both exchange-traded and over-the-counter 
-- OTC).  On the other hand, they consider low tax rates, ranging from 0.01% to 0.1% of 
the transaction value.  This results in projected revenue yields of up to about 1% of GDP 
                                                 
8 This reflects the fact that spread in the wholesale interbank foreign exchange market are well below 0.1 
percent. 
9 Spahn (2002) proposed a rate of 0.01% for a projected annual revenue of €17 billion (based on 2001 
data).   11 
for Austria, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands; 2% in Germany and 13% in the 
UK. In the latter two countries, exchange traded derivative transactions are important, 
elsewhere the bulk of the revenue comes from OTC transactions.  Schulmeister do not 
appear to include cash withdrawals from the banking system as part of their base. 
 
More comprehensive financial transactions taxes, such as Feige’s (2001) APT (discussed 
further below) have even larger ambition, including, in Feige’s case, the replacement of 




(iii) Bank debit taxes 
The transactions taxes that have actually generated the biggest revenues in practice have 
had a much more limited base.  The most important of these have been in Latin America, 
where they have generally been introduced for revenue purposes.  Their history is 
somewhat chequered (Coelho et al., 2001; Kirilenko and Summers, 2003; Baca-
Campodónico et al., 2006).  Revenue from the Latin American bank debit taxes has 
varied widely, but has typically been of the order of 1 percent of GDP. The highest 
revenue achieved in relative terms was the 3.4% of GDP reached in Ecuador’s short-
lived ICC (1999-2000), was, however, creditable against income tax for which it been 
intended as a replacement.
11
 
   
The biggest bank debit tax in absolute terms, Brazil’s unpopular CPMF (“check tax”),
12 
dating back to 1993, had levied a charge 0.38% (originally 0.25%) on all withdrawals 
from checking accounts and raised as much as USD 10  billion per annum or about [4%] 
of total government revenue. This tax expired in December 2007 (though another 
transactions tax IOF was retained, albeit subject to modifications during 2008).
13
                                                 
10 Crisp proposes a ½% rate on USD 1,000 trillion of bank payments (said to apply to the US in 2002), for 
a revenue of $5 trillion comfortably in excess of twice current tax revenues.   
   
11 Analysing the transactions taxes of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, Baca-
Campodónico et al. (2006) find that revenue decreases over time and that  the rate of decrease is a direct 
function of the rate of the levy, 
12 CPMF stands for Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos 
e Direitos de Natureza Financiera.  For a critique of the effects of this tax see Albuquerque (2006). 
13 Older forms of revenue tax such as the stamp duty on cheques in the US and the UK and the Bank 
Account Debit tax in Australia were not applied at proportional rates.  (For example, the Australian tax was  
€0.15 on amounts up to $100, but only $2 on any amount of $10,000 or more). The US and UK stamp   12 
 
The much higher tax rate of 1½% was imposed by Venezuela in its bank debits tax of 
2007, but was limited to debits on behalf of enterprises (with individuals exempt) (Salon, 
2007).   
 
Colabella and Coppinger (1996) were more ambitious for the revenue of their WXT bank 
debit tax.  Its base was to be limited to non-debt generating withdrawals from banks, but 
they proposed the rather implausibly high rate of tax of 5% on this base, easily sufficient 
in their view to compensate for the abolition of all other taxes.   
 
Interestingly, not all bank debit taxes have had a revenue purpose.  The Indian Banking 
Cash Transactions Tax (BCTT) of 2005-9, imposed at a rate of 0.1% on cash 
withdrawals from banks, was said by the Finance Minister to have “served a very useful 
purpose in enlarging the information system of the Income Tax Department.” Its 
withdrawal was attributed to the relevant information being available through “other 
instruments introduced in the last few years”; it had yielded little more than 0.01% of 
GDP. 
  
2.4  Win-win 
One of the great attractions of any corrective tax is the potential to generate a “double-
dividend”: reducing the social bad and generating revenue.  This has long been a goal of 
tax reformers whether focused on improving society’s health through taxes on tobacco or 
improving the environment and limiting global climate change with a carbon tax.  To an 
extent, the double-dividend may be elusive not least because a tax on a social bad that 
eliminates the bad has likely
14
                                                                                                                                                 
taxes on checks were at a fixed amount per check, regardless of the face value.  Lastrapes and Selgin 
(1997) examine the US check tax during the early to mid 1930s, concluding that it led to “about a 15 
percent increase in the currency-demand deposit ratio, and about a 12 percent decline in the M1 money 
stock.” (pp. 859)  Importantly for the present discussion, transaction size substantively increased while the 
number of transactions significantly decreased.(p.868 and footnote 43).  Revenues were only about half of 
what had been hoped for (see their footnote 39).  As with the annual charge of €40 on a credit or debit card 
applied by Ireland, taxes that are not proportional to the value of transactions are inherently limited in their 
revenue potential and need not be considered further here.  
 destroyed its own base.   
14 Though not necessarily, if non-linear tax schedules are permitted.   13 
 
That the double-dividend is also a goal of current financial taxation reformers is well-
evidenced in their writings.  
 
While the CTT was originally proposed by Tobin in 1972 as a means of dampening 
destabilizing currency speculation, it received renewed interest from the revenue 
perspective in the 1990s reflecting, in Nissanke’s (2004) view, not only “growing 
recognition that there is an urgent need for creating a new international financial 
architecture governing cross-border capital flows in the face of the repeated severe 
financial crises”, but also “its potential to serve as an important source of finance for 
‘global public goods’”.  
 
However, numerous authors point out that speculative attacks on a currency peg might 
not be deterred by a small CTT rate suitable for raising steady revenue.
15
 
 In the words of 
Mende and Menkhoff (2003), a low Tobin tax will not curb speculation, and a high rate 
will significantly reduce liquidity.  
For STTs also, reformers see a double-dividend.  Thus Baker (2008) remarks: 
A modest financial transactions tax could easily raise an amount equal to 
1% of GDP, or $150bn a year at present. This is real money – enough to 
finance a 10% across-the-board reduction in the income tax.  A tax of 
0.25% on a stock trade or 0.02% on the purchase of credit default swap 
will have no measurable impact on productive financial transactions, but 
will likely put a serious dent in speculative activity. 
As mentioned above, the capacity of the tax to deal with the particular social bad being 
targeted in that quotation is somewhat questionable: a securities transactions tax may 
                                                 
15 Cf. Nissanke (2004), Spahn (2002).  The latter advocates adoption of a time-varying CTT rate could be 
adopted according to which the tax rate would jump (through a type of trip-wire mechanism) when the 
currency regime was under pressure.   14 
actually worsen price misalignments and volatility.  However, the objective of a double 
dividend has obvious attraction. 
 
Sharp falls in the stock prices of banks and other vulnerable firms during 2008 prompted 
a critique of short-selling in the equity market and price spikes in the credit default swap 
market, to the point where it was suggested that manipulation of these markets had 
contributed to the bankruptcy of some firms.   
 
3.  Could a transactions tax have stemmed excesses leading to the recent crisis? 
However, volatile prices and short-term speculation have taken a back seat in current 
discussions about financial market failure, being replaced by concerns about (i) the 
valuation and rating of structured financial products, especially collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) constructed directly or indirectly from portfolios of mortgage-backed 
loans (Coval et al., 2009), and (ii) the misallocation of risk, and possible market 
manipulations associated with credit default swaps (CDS).   
  
CDOs 
Interestingly, the failures in this structured finance market have little to do with frequent 
trading, or with complex sequences of transactions such as would be discouraged by a 
transactions tax.  The complexity is largely in the combination of and reallocation of 
contractual claims, rather in the payments themselves.  Even though derivatives 
transactions represent the bulk of financial transactions, a comprehensive financial 
transactions tax would have no appreciable impact on the construction and sale of 
mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives.  These are typically buy-to-hold 
securities and certainly are not sufficiently liquid to be repeatedly traded on a minute-to-
minute basis as are foreign exchange and major financial indices.  The major problem 
with these assets relates to the fact that so many of them (“about 60 percent of all global 
rated structured products were AAA-rated in contrast to less than 1 percent of corporate 
issues”, and these ratings were highly sensitive to assumptions notably about likely 
default correlations of the underlying assets and about the likely default rates on   15 
underlying securities, both of which were grossly underestimated by the rating agencies 
(Coval et al., 2009). 
 
With a high proportion of structured finance products that had initially been rated AAA 
having been downgraded to junk status, investors lost confidence in this market.  By late 
2008 the structured finance market had virtually closed down, with almost no new issues, 
and specialists did ot expect it to reopen for years.  Evidently, then, no tax could have a 
further corrective effect in discouraging issues. 
 
Nor was there ever much revenue potential in these securities.  Quarterly issuance of 
them peaked in 2006-7 at around USD 100 billion per quarter.  As primarily buy-and-




 of the total lifetime tax revenue from that issue – a mere USD 10 million for 
the peak quarter (assuming a tax rate of 0.01 percent). 
CDS 
The relatively sudden emergence of the credit default swap market starting in the late 
1990s has been identified as a significant contributor to the growing distortions of the 
credit market during the following decade (Tett, 2009).  By 2008, the gross amount of 
debt insured through CDS was thought to exceed ÙSD 60 trillion,
17
                                                 
16 Transactions data on CDOs is not collected by the BIS. 
 though many of the 
contracts were back-to-back and resulted in negligible net risk.  The net amount of CDS-
insured debt may not have exceeded USD 15 trillion.  These amounts have subsequently 
declined.  Even on this net amount, the flow of premia was only a fraction of the sums 
insured (especially considering that most of the debt insured was highly rated.  Indeed, 
the first CDS contracts entailed annual premia of just 0.02 percent of the nominal amount 
insured.  Riskier debt of course carries a much higher premium.  Even on the sovereign 
debt of some European Union countries, CDS premia have approached 400 basis points 
(4 percent) at times during the recent crisis.   
17 The BIS half-yearly estimate of the nominal value of outstanding Credit derivatives (most of them CDS) 
peaked at USD 58 trillion at end-December 2007.  At that date, the gross market value of the contracts was 
USD 2 trillion, a figure which jumped to USD 5 trillion by the end of 2008 because of the movements in 
premia and hence in the replacement values of each of the outstanding positions.   16 
 
The critique of CDS as a destabilizing force is two-fold.  First, it is argued that these 
contracts served to transfer risk from those who wished to shed not to those able to 
absorb it, but to those who didn’t understand it – or alternatively to those who did 
understand it as a tail risk which would be passed to the taxpayer (as indeed it was in the 
case of the failed insurance company AIG).  This refers mainly to the primary market and 
not to repeated trading in the secondary market.  Second, it is argued that this market can 
be manipulated because of the thinness of the secondary market
18
 
 in CDS or because the 
volume of insurance bought on particular names greatly exceeds the volume of their debt 
outstanding. By operating in both the primary market for a company’s debt and in the 
CDS market, a manipulative investor could make money by driving the company into 
default.  This refers mainly to trading in the secondary market, though not necessarily 
repeated trading.   
This double critique of CDS as destabilizing the financial system is not unproblematic.  
Clearly these instruments could also be used – and were – as a way of spreading and 
distributing risk in a stabilizing way also.  Arguably, if subjected to certain 
administrative controls and traded only in well-organized exchanges, these instruments 
could be strong force for stability.  However, even if one granted the premise that CDS 
have been destabilizing and need to be discouraged, it would be hard to argue that a 
transactions tax applied at a low rate would be effective in reducing the damage. 
 
After all, a transactions tax applied only to the actual premiums paid would of course 
have no effect on secondary market trading, and indeed a standard transactions tax 
applied to CDS premium payments would have negligible effects both in revenue and 
market behavior.
19
                                                 
18 Transactions volume on CDS is not collected by the BIS. 
  Applying a transactions tax to the nominal volume of debt insured 
would be more promising from the revenue point of view but, at the much-less-than-one-
per-cent levels envisaged for a standard transactions tax, would not have much effect on 
19 If the average premium on USD 60 trillion is 50 basis points, a 0..01 percent transactions tax would 
probably not discourage many of these transactions, but would generate only USD 50 million in annual 
revenue.   17 
the two efficiency problems mentioned for CDS – wrong ultimate holder and market 
manipulation. 
   
Correcting agent incentives 
There is of course a broader critique of finance which rightly points the finger at 
distorted incentive structures for agents.  This would include both traders and other 
operational officers of financial intermediaries and of CEOs and other senior staff who 
should be supervising operations and ensuring that the institution is set on a prudent 
course.  Tax structures could be used to alter the incentive profile of senior staff, but so 
far attempts to design such structures have not been successful.  For example, the cap 
since 1993 of USD 1 million on tax deductibility (for the firm) of senior directors’ 
remuneration seems to have had little effect (Rose and Wofram, 2002).  Clearly, while 
transactions taxes could have a significant effect on the profits of various lines of 
business that could indirectly affect the incentive structure facing individual traders and 
CEOs, they could not easily be fine-tuned to achieve the desired re-alignment of the 
private incentives of these individuals with public goals. 
 
These considerations cast doubt on the potential for achieving a double-dividend coming 
from a financial transactions tax that would somehow discourage the accumulation of 
toxic debt, while still yielding sizable revenue. 
 
4.  Some statistics on the starting base of a comprehensive transactions tax 
Data on financial transactions (as distinct from financial stocks) has been growing 
rapidly in the past decade or so, but are still rather patchy.   
 
Payments transactions 
Payments data, covering both the number and the aggregate value of payments is 
available on a annual basis for some 13 countries in the so-called CPSS Red Book.
20
                                                 
20 CPSS, (2009), The first cross-country publication including statistics on payments systems covered the 
Group of 10 industrial countries and Switzerland and referred to 1977-78.  Since then, an annual survey, 
now conducted under the auspices of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, has expanded 
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Data is shown separately for different payments methods employed by nonbanks, such as 
credits, direct debits, cheques, e-money payment transactions, and card transactions of 
different types.  Interbank transactions through the major automated clearing systems are 
also shown. 
 
In 2007, aggregate payments of nonbanks reported in the Red Book came to USD 479 
trillion, with USD 2459 trillion in interbank payments.  Adding these two together gives 
us a round figure of USD 3000 trillion in payments.  Since this is almost one hundred 
times the aggregate GDP of the countries included in the Red Book,
21
 
 it becomes clear 
why it could seem superficially plausible that a very small tax rate – a fraction of one 
percent – might generate almost all the revenue any government could need. 
Interestingly, though, there is a sizable variation across countries in the ratio of payments 
transactions to GDP, varying – for the most recent year available, i.e. 2007, from 36 
times in Italy and 55 times in Sweden (2006) to 129 in the US and 147 in Hong Kong 
(even though the Hong Kong data only includes interbank transactions (Figure 1).  This 
is not merely a function of whether or not the country hosts a global financial center: 
Germany and France also have multiples in excess of 100, while Singapore is the fourth 
smallest country.   
 
The wide variation suggests that payments transactions may not be stable in response to 
influences such as the imposition of a transactions tax.   The volatility over time in the 
ratio is also sizable in some countries (Figures 2, 3; Tables 1, 3), with a coefficient of 
variation as high as 40 percent in Switzerland – though it is likely that much of that is 
attributable to some institutional or definitional changes. 
 
Turning to non-interbank payments transactions, the aggregate value ratio to GDP for the 
reporting countries is much lower at under 15.  Furthermore, the figure for the UK – 77 – 
is a wide outlier, certainly reflecting its status as a financial center and likely especially 
                                                                                                                                                 
and deepened its coverage but added only two additional countries (Hong Kong and Singapore), as well as 
the Euro zone, to the original 11. 
21 The ratio is actually 89 for 2007, and varies between 75 and 89 in the period 2000-2007   19 
reflecting London’s dominant role in the foreign exchange market.  Removing this 
outlier reduced the aggregate value ratio to GDP to under 9.  Suddenly, one realizes that 
a bank debit tax which does not apply to interbank transactions and is applied at a small 
rate simply cannot raise current levels of revenue.  Even if transactions were completely 
insensitive to the rate of tax, the required minimum tax rate to replace all other taxes and 
cover government expenditure jumps from an average of `less than 0.5% to over 3% 
(Table 2). 
 
These points are further elaborated in the Appendix. 
 
Derivatives transactions 
What of other financial transactions?  Spot foreign exchange transactions worldwide in 
2007 can be estimated at about USD 250 trillion, based on grossing up the daily average 
figures in the BIS triennial survey for that year.  Presumably, these spot foreign exchange 
transactions are already counted in the payments transactions data of the CPSS.  That 
would also be true of outright securities purchases and sales. 
 
But not all of the large and growing volume of derivative transactions is included in 
payments transactions as to their full national value, as settlement for these is generally 
on some form of net basis.  If the scope of general transactions was extended to 
derivatives also, and applied to their full nominal value, this would expand the base of 
the tax considerably. 
 
Data on over-the-counter transactions in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives 
are collected on a sample basis for one month every three years from 54 reporting 
countries (BIS, 2007).   More comprehensive data on exchange-traded derivative is also 
collected from the main organized exchanges (BIS, 2009b, Table 23).  Finally every six 
months the BIS (2009a) collects figures on the outstanding stock of (but not the 
transactions in) OTC derivatives, including credit and equity-related derivatives not 
counted in triennial survey. 
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An overall summary of the transactions data is as follows:  Total turnover (nominal 
value) of futures and options derivatives quoted on organized exchanges came to USD 
2214 trillion in 2008. (About two-thirds were interest rate futures and rather more than a 
quarter were interest rate options).  Estimated turnover in OTC exchange rate and interest 
rate derivatives came to USD 1250 trillion, of which two-thirds related to exchange rate 
contracts and the remainder to interest rate contracts.
22
 
  Thus in broad terms, the total 
turnover of derivatives is of the same order of magnitude as payments transactions, if 
slightly smaller.  Unfortunately, we have no full breakdown of how many of these 
transactions relate to non-financial firms. 
Extending the scope of a general transactions tax from payments transactions to 
transactions involving derivatives and applied to the total nominal value of the objects of 
those derivatives about doubles the initial base of the tax. 
 
As discussed in the next section, the elasticity of the base of tax on derivatives to the tax 
rate may, however, be much higher. 
 
5.  Impact on behavior and on the base 
The base of a transactions tax is likely to be very elastic in response to a tax.  The top of 
the Laffer curve might be reached at a surprisingly low level.   
 
Mende and Menkhoff (2003) have argued rather convincingly that even a very small tax 
would dramatically alter the way in which wholesale participants in the foreign exchange 
market operate. Drawing on a specialized literature which studies the microstructure of 
the foreign exchange market (cf. Lyons, 2001), they point out that the strategy of the 
typical bank participant involves buying and selling foreign exchange as if it was a hot 
potato.  Their goal in this is to minimize the risk that they are uninformed about a change 
in prospects.  For that reason they will not want to accumulate a significant stock.  They 
                                                 
22 In contrast, the stock of OTC exchange rate related derivatives is only one-eighth that of interest rate 
derivatives.  The exchange rate derivatives have a much higher ratio of turnover to end-period stock, 
probably reflecting in part their very short median maturity and the microstructure of this market discussed 
above.   21 
report as an example a bank with a median open position of about USD 2 million, which 
nevertheless trades about USD 50 million per day.  It is inconceivable that a strategy 
necessitating such frequent trading would survive even a very small transactions tax.  
Instead, banks would deal in the market in some entirely different way. 
 
A similar argument could apply also to the microstructure of trading in the interest rate 
derivatives market. Take interest rate swaps, which account for over two-thirds of the 
OTC turnover in interest-rate related derivatives.  Although invented to allow corporate 
borrowers to lock in a long-term interest rate even though they had borrowed at floating 
rates, use of interest rate swaps has  “since grown into one of the most useful and liquid 
derivatives markets in the world…used across the fixed-income markets to manage risks, 
speculate, manage duration and lock in interest rates (Pimco, 2008).” Indeed, swap rates 
are now in some respects a more important indicator of bond market conditions than 
Treasury bill rates.   
 
It seems impossible in this context to fully decompose the multiple uses of such 
derivatives in hedging and assuming risk.  We can conjecture that such a multi-function 
instrument traded with such low transactions costs will have a very high elasticity of 
demand with respect to these costs.   
 
This view is reinforced by a reading of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
securities market microstructure in general.  This literature which emphasizes the way in 
which the pattern of price quotations and trading can be influenced by modest differences 
in flow of information and the organization of the market (for example in some markets 
informed traders place quantity orders, whereas in others the wholesale liquidity 
providers post prices at which they are prepared to trade). 
 
Formal models illustrate how, when new information arrives, whether from the flow of 
orders received by specialist traders, or otherwise, the required adjustments in the 
optimal portfolio (of any class of assets) both of informed and uninformed investors can 
be very considerable (cf. O’Hara, 2003).  However, different assumptions about the way   22 
in which information arrives in the market, how it is distributed and the way in which the 
market is organized, have very different implications for the volume of trading and how 
it varies.  There can also be multiple equilibria with higher volumes of trading associated 
with lower spreads and higher social welfare (see for example Biais et al., 2005, pp.225-
227).  This could explain the way on which trading volume clusters at certain times of 
the day. 
 
If the continuous flow of information in the market necessitates repeated re-adjustments 
of dealer inventory and portfolio rebalancing, the imposition of a transactions tax could, 
for example, lead to market arrangements shifting from continuous trading to a periodic 
“call”.  This might not cause much welfare loss, but substantially lower revenue from the 
tax. 
 
Even setting aside the high end financial market transactions, the distorting effect of a 
transactions tax can be significant even if it referred directly only to real sector 
transactions.  Other consequences – for the way in which wages are paid: cash or credit, 
or in the degree to which suitcases of cash are carried physically across borders – could 
also have damaging side-effects. 
 
Ignoring the effects on financial intermediation, Suescún (2004) models the cascading of 
a transactions tax through the production process and “disregards its effect on financial 
intermediation” and thus the resulting effects, showing that deadweight loss calculations 
are sensitive to the modeling of economic growth.   
 
Although deadweight costs for a given tax rise with the square of the tax rate, it is 
fallacious to suppose that different taxes can be ranked as to their deadweight costs by 
reference only to the rates of tax.  The elasticity of the tax base also matters.  A low rate 
of tax applied to a very elastic market could result in more costly distortions of that 
market than results from a higher rate of tax applied to a market with lower elasticity. 
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6.  Concluding remarks 
Although conditions are better than ever for the introduction of a broad-based financial 
transactions tax, expectations for such a tax are likely to be disappointed.  Even if the 
bolt-hole of tax havens to which transactions might migrate is effectively shut-off, 
neither the revenue nor the efficiency gains hoped-for by big picture tax reformers are 
likely to materialize. 
 
The tax base, whether measured by the total value of automated payments transactions or 
broadened to include the gross nominal value of derivatives transactions, is certainly 
large.  But much of the base is strikingly concentrated in a small number of countries.  
This reflects the dominance of multiple technical transactions among wholesale financial 
market participants as they manage the risks of acting as market makers in foreign 
exchange and securities trading.  The volume of such transactions would collapse with 
the imposition of even a small transactions tax undermining its potential to generate 
sufficient revenue to replace all other taxes as has been hoped-for by some.   
 
Market-makers would change their method of handling risk in any of a variety of ways 
that would sharply reduce the volume and total value of transactions.  To the extent that 
these alternative risk management procedures left the market makers with higher risk, 
spreads in these markets would increase and liquidity (as measured for example by the 
degree to which large trades could be absorbed without moving prices) would decline. 
 
And a transactions tax would have little effect in discouraging the activities of the credit 
default swap market, the market in securitized sub-prime mortgages, or other derivatives-
based markets whose malfunction is thought to have contributed to the recent crisis. 
 
Certainly not a panacea, and more likely a damp squib in terms both of revenue and 
efficiency gains (and perhaps more likely to result in efficiency losses), financial 
transactions taxes could be a threat to fiscal stability if overoptimistically seized upon as 
a reason for abolishing more reliable revenue sources.   24 
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Table 2:  Rate of transactions tax required to generate current revenue 







Table 3: Rate of transactions tax required to generate current revenue 
(assuming no response of the tax base) 
 (All payments taxed) (%) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Belgium  0.14  0.14  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.22  0.20  0.15 
Canada  0.63  0.54  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.53  0.49  0.47 
France  0.42  0.36  0.37  0.38  0.36  0.57  0.53  0.51 
Germany      0.64  0.64  0.65  0.60  0.56  0.37 
Italy  1.01  1.12  1.12  1.15  1.14  1.01  0.91  1.10 
Japan      0.59  0.61  0.58  0.57  0.51   
Netherlands  0.42  0.41  0.42  0.42  0.40  0.41  0.40  0.36 
Singapore  0.16  0.15  0.26  0.21  0.24  0.19  0.21  0.19 
Sweden  0.49    0.52  0.50  0.54  0.50  0.50  3.79 
Switzerland  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09 
United Kingdom  0.28  0.28  0.31  0.31  0.32  0.34  0.31  0.34 
United States  0.24  0.23  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.25  0.23 
Note: The table shows the ratio of government revenue to the total of automated payments in percent 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009a. 
"Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries - Figures for 2007," CPSS 
Publications No 86. Bank for International Settlements, 2009b. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Total payments/ GDP  82.2  42.2  6.5  220.7 
Nonbank payments/ GDP  21.8  28.4  2.8  112.3 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Tax rate all payments  0.46%  0.44%  0.04%  3.8% 
Tax rate nonbank payments  3.24%  2.42%  0.09%  10.7%   29 
Value of payments as multiple of GDP















Figure 1: Nonbank payments / GDP (2006) for all available countries 
Source: CPSS (2009). 
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Value of nonbank payments multiple of GDP














Figure 2: Total payments / GDP (2006) for all available countries  







Figure 3: Payments as % GDP over time 
Source: CPSS (2009).   32 
Appendix:  Calculating lower bound for a unitary tax on automated payments 
 
As a first step to judging the revenue potential for transaction taxes, it is instructive to 
estimate the ratio of government expenditure to the tax base.  If the tax base were 
insensitive to the imposition of a tax, a transactions tax at this rate would generate 
enough revenue to pay for all the expenditure.  In principle, then, one could imagine all 
other taxes being replaced by the transactions tax.
 23
 
  Therefore we call this rate the 
minimum unitary transactions tax rate.  It is a minimum because it does not take account 
of the elasticity of the tax base; unitary because it could replace all other taxes.  Of coure 
this calculation also neglects other endogenous responses of the economic system to such 
a drastic change in conditions.  It is only a baseline indication of the scale of taxes 
required.       
The tax rate was generated using data from the Bank for International Settlements and 
from the International Monetary Fund.
24 These data were designed by taking the total 
level of expenditures in a country for a given year
25 and dividing this total by a 





Figure A1 depicts the tax rate needed to cover current general expenditures for selected 
countries (the data is also shown as Table A2.
27
 
  These rates exemplify the different 
needs across countries.  Each nation has different needs and transaction tax bases upon 
which to tax.   
As discussed in the text, the response of interbank payments to even a small transactions 
tax could be very large.  An alternative calculation of the minimum unitary tax excluded 
interbank payments and this is shown in Table A1 and Figure A3.  As is clear, much 
higher figures are obtained. 
 
Table A1:  Required Rates for Unitary Payments Tax  
Statistics from 11 countries 2000-2007 
                                                 
23 Although the Feige proposal intended to increase government expenditures by removing indirect 
subsidies, quantification of the value of indirect subsidies and estimating how many of them will be carried 
forward into direct subsidies contains too many assumptions to contribute anything meaningful to the 
debate. 
24 All data was calculated in terms of billons of US dollars.  When exchange rates were needed, the average 
exchange rate for the local currency to the US Dollar was used for the given year.  When fiscal years do 
not occur within the calendar year, the numbers are assumed to be consistent for cross year comparison so 
that no adjustments were made.  IMF data generally used rows a1 and a2 whenever possible.  However, 
data limitations necessitated the use of c1 and c2 for some nations.  Whenever both were available, 
preference was given to a1 and a2.  Occasionally, when both were available for some years, c1 and c2 were 
used to provide consistency with data obtained for previous years.   Data available upon request. 
25 International Financial Statistics. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009a. line 82 
26  "Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries - Figures for 2007," CPSS 
Publications No 86. Bank for International Settlements, 2009b. 
2727 Sweden was dropped due to a significant statistical outlier occurring with 2007 which was not 
statistically within the valid range.  Hong Kong has been omitted from this analysis due to a lack of 
information about end-user based transactions and government expenditure / revenue.   33 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Max 
All payments taxed  0.46  0.44  5.03  37.6  3.79 
Nonbank payments only  3.24  2.42  0.86  3.4  10.7 
  
Figure A2: Minimum unitary tax rates: 11 countries 2000-2007: all payments taxed 
Note: This shows the ratio of total government expenditure to the total value of payments transactions.  If 
transactions were insensitive to the imposition of a tax, this would represent the rate of transactions tax 
required to yield enough revenue to match government expenditure. 
 
Ideally, the requisite tax rate would be the same for all countries within the APT tax 
perimeter.  If the tax rate was not the same, then a normally distribution of tax rates 
would provide a solid foundation for creating the international consensus necessary to 
implement the multi-national dimension of the APT tax proposal.  The Skewness and 
Kurtosis present in the tax rate using all transactions suggest that the distribution of tax 
rates for each country-year is not Gaussian.   
 
Nonparametric estimation techniques allow for a more representative depiction of the 
distribution of tax rate density.  Because tax rates are fundamentally continuous, the 
distribution should be analysed as a continuous variable rather than discrete.  Figure 2 
depicts the density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel of the tax rate distribution.   
This figure shows a non-trivial density building around a transaction rate of 1 percent.  
This density suggests the possibility, even when using all transactions, of some form of 
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Figure A2: Smoothed probability density of the minimum unitary tax rates for 11 
countries 2000-2007 – all payments taxed 
   
The distribution substantially changes when one looks at only end-user transactions.  
Figure A3 represents the distribution of tax rates for county-years relying only on the 
taxes generated from nonbank (end-user) transactions.  This distribution represents a 
worst-case-scenario where all back-end transactions used for financial intermediation are 
removed from the tax base.
28
 
  Examination of Figure A3 reveals that many of the 
distortions in the distribution smoothed over.   The mean tax rate increased and 
dispersion widened.   
Figures A1 through A3 illustrate the differences between each country in the desired tax 
rate.  This illustrates the difficulties of deploying this proposal on a multinational scale.
29
                                                 
28 Recall from the literature review of previous implementations of transactions taxes that many 
intermediation transactions were removed from the tax base. 
  
The differences in dispersion illustrate the difficulties which could arise if the financial 
sector changes its transaction demands based upon the tax.  National governments may 
well find themselves facing revenue shortfalls and a need to increase the tax rate rapidly 
to cover any decline in revenue caused by arbitrage.   The possibility of tax-clubs 
suggested from the nonparametric kernel density estimates should give pause to policy 
makers in selecting nations to include in this proposal.  Further examination of the 
circumstances leading to Italy’s higher requisite tax rate seems warranted.  
29 As recently illustrated, recent statements from policy makers on trying to develop mechanisms 
addressing tax havens may provide a mechanism to prevent arbitrage caused by rate differences within the 
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Figure A3: Smoothed probability density of the minimum unitary tax rates for 11 
countries 2000-2007 – only nonbank payments taxed 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 